Martyrs of the Green Movement

by MUHAMMAD SAHIMI in Los Angeles

19 Jun 2010 19:3517 Comments

Names of 110 killed in political violence over the past year.

The Iranian year of 1388 ended on March 20, 2010. It was one of the most turbulent years in the country's modern history. Its beginning and end were both marked by much promise, but for completely different reasons. The year had begun with the hope that the presidential election of June 12, 2009, would result in the election of a candidate with a vision for a better Iran -- a more open, more tolerant society, with less corruption, no political crimes, freedom of the press, and freedom of thought. This hope was dashed when the hardliners rigged the election and declared Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the "victor."

But precisely due to this antidemocratic fraud, the Green Movement that had arisen before the election gathered strength. It spread its wings and presented to the world a completely different image of Iran: a country with a young, educated, dynamic population that is willing to stand up to the forces of oppression and repression, express itself eloquently, and sacrifice for a better future. Thus, as Iran begins its new year, there is renewed hope.

The past year also recorded the largest number of Iranian people who lost their lives due to political violence since the bloody summer of 1988 (1367 in the Iranian calendar), when about 4,500 political prisoners were executed. The riots that erupted in mid-1992 and, particularly, the Eslamshahr riots of April 1995 did result in many deaths (though still not as many as in 2009), but they had mostly to do mostly with people's anger over rampant inflation and lack of basic services and were not fundamentally political.

How many people were murdered in 1388 due to political violence? No one really knows, and in a nation where there is virtually no independent press to serve as a watchdog, it is very difficult to get an accurate estimate of the total number of casualties. We can, however, distinguish between two groups among those confirmed as dead. In one group are those whose families have declared the martyrdom of their loved ones to the two committees that Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have set up for compiling the list of the killed. In the second group are those whose families have been under tremendous pressure not to report the death of their loved ones to the two committees, and not to speak to the press.

The credible Iranian sources reporting on the number of people killed include Norooz News, the website of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, Iran's largest political party and leading reformist group; Kalame, Mousavi's official website; and Kalameh Sabz, Jonbeshe-Rah-e Sabz, and Aras News, three reformist news sites supportive of the Green Movement. In a few cases, news wires aligned with the hardliners, such as the Fars News Agency, which is controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, have also confirmed the deaths of demonstrators or those who were arrested.

Several organizations have also published lists of people whose deaths have been confirmed by multiple credible sources. One is the League for the Defense of Human Rights in Iran. Its list of confirmed murders, containing more than 100 names, was first published in August 2009 and updated on March 10, 2010. A list of 72 names was published by Aseman Daily News in September 2009. Norooz News just published the precise addresses of the graves of 50 people in Tehran's Behesht-e Zahra cemetery.

What follows is the list of 107 confirmed dead collated from all of the credible sources. Their age, if known, is in parentheses. First, a few statistics: 13 of the killed (12 percent) were women; at least 23 of them were university students (22 percent); two were tortured to death; two were journalists. In several cases, there is no information about how the victims were killed -- all we know is the location of their graves.

1. Neda Agha Soltan (27), university student, murdered on June 20, 2009, in Tehran.
2. Kianoush Asa, university student, killed on June 15, 2009, in Tehran.
3. Behzad Aghazadeh Ghahramani, murdered on July 17, 2009, after the Friday prayers in Tehran led by former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
4. Morad Aghasi, murdered on July 17, 2009, in the Kahrizak detention center on the southern edge of Tehran.
5. Mina Ehterami, university student, killed on June 15, 2009, in the attack on the Tehran University dormitory.
6. Hossein Akhtar Zand (32), murdered on June 15, 2009, in Shiraz.
7. Arman Estakhripour (18), beaten to death on July 13, 2009, in Shiraz.
8. Neda Asadi; nothing is known about the circumstances of her death.
9. Amir Eslamian, university student, working for Mousavi's campaign; his body was discovered on November 27, 2009, in Boukan.
10. Saeed Esmaeili Khanbebin (23), hit in the head and killed.
11. Sohrab Erabi (19), pre-university student, murdered in Evin Prison on June 20, 2009.
12. Alireza Eftekhari (29), journalist, killed by hits to the head on June 15, 2009; his body was given to his family the following month.
13. Naser Amirnejad (26), university student in aerospace engineering, killed in Yasouj.
14. Mohsen Entezami, murdered in the Kahrizak detention center on July 14, 2009.
15. Vahed Akbari (34), killed on June 20, 2009, after his arrest in Tehran's Vanak Square.
16. Hossein Akbari, killed by hits to the head on July 26, 2009.
17. Mohsen Imani, university student, killed in the attack on the Tehran University dormitory on June 15, 2009.
18. Fatemeh Barati, university student, killed in the attack on the Tehran University dormitory on June 15, 2009.
19. Mohammad Hossein Barzegar (25), killed by a bullet to his head, after being arrested in Tehran's Haft-e Teer Square on June 17, 2009.
20. Yaghoub Boroayeh, university student, killed by a bullet on June 25, 2009.
21. Jafar Boroayeh, assistant professor at the University of Ahwaz, killed by a bullet to his head on June 28, 2009.
22. Sorour Borouman (58), killed on June 15, 2009, in Tehran.
23. Hamed Besharati (26), blogger and poet; nothing is known about the circumstances of his death.
24. Jahanbakhsh Pazouki (31), killed by a knife on December 28, 2009 (Day of Ashura).
25. Mohammad Javad Parandakh, university student; nothing is known about how he was killed.
26. Dr. Ramin Pourandarjani, physician on duty in the Kahrizak detention center, presumably poisoned on November 10, 2009.
27. Amir Arshaf Tajmir, killed on December 28, 2009 (Day of Ashura) in Tehran.
28. Farzad Jashni, killed on June 20, 2009.
29. Somayyeh Jafargholi, university student, killed by a bullet on September 27, 2009.
30. Bahman Jenabi; nothing is known about the circumstances of his death.
31. Amir Javadifar, university student, arrested on July 9, 2009; died in prison.
32. Moharram Chegini Gheshlaghi (35); nothing is known about how he was murdered.
33. Mohsen Haddadi (24), computer programmer, killed by a bullet to his forehead on June 23, 2009.
34. Ali Hassanpour, killed on June 15, 2009, in Tehran's Azadi Square; his body was given to his family 105 days later.
35. Amir Mehdi Hamzehlouei, killed in Gheyterieh Park in Tehran on October 2, 2009.
36. Hesam Hanifeh (19), killed by a bullet to his chin on June 16, 2009.
37. Mehrdad Heidari, journalist, killed on July 13, 2009, in Mashhad.
38. Masoud Khosravi, killed in Tehran's Azadi Square on June 15, 2009.
39. Sh. Khezri, university student, killed in Tehran's Baharestan Square on June 15, 2009.
40. Abbas Disnad (40), killed by hits to his head on June 20, 2009; his body was given to his family after $15,000 was paid.
41. Mohammad Raeis-Najafi, beaten to death near Tehran's Azadi Square on June 15, 2009.
42. Mohammad Ali Rasekhi-Nia (40), killed by a bullet on December 28, 2009 (Day of Ashura).
43. Fatemeh Rajabpour (38), killed with her mother, Ms. Borouman (number 22 above).
44. Shahrokh Rahmani (26), run over by a car on December 28, 2009 (Day of Ashura) in Tehran.
45. Dr. Rahimi; nothing is known about the circumstances of his death.
46. Hamid Rezaei, killed on January 1, 2010, in Homayounshahr.
47. Ramin Ramazani (22); nothing is known about how he was murdered.
48. Mohsen Ruhol-amini (25), university student, killed in the Kahrizak detention center.
49. Babak Sepehr (35); nothing is known about how he was killed.
50. Fahimeh Selahshour (25), killed by hits to her head in Tehran's Vali-Asr Square on June 14, 2009.
51. Fatemeh Semsarpour, killed by a bullet on June 20, 2009, near Tehran's Azadi Square.
52. Ashkan Sohrabi (18), high school student, killed by a bullet in Tehran on June 20, 2009.
53. Tina Soudi, university student, killed by a bullet on June 20, 2009, in Tehran's Enghelab Square.
54. Hassan Shapouri, killed on July 14, 2009.
55. Ali Shahnazar (41), killed on September 29, 2009.
56. Ali Shahedi (24), killed on June 21, 2009, while detained by police.
57. Kasra Sharafi, university student, killed in the attack on the Tehran University dormitory on June 15, 2009.
58. Kambiz Shoaei, university student, killed in the attack on the Tehran University dormitory on June 15, 2009.
59. Shafi' Nejad, killed on June 15, 2009.
60. Zahed Shekarabi (20), tortured to death in Esfahan on July 21, 2009.
61. Yousef Saleh; nothing is known about how he was murdered.
62. Davoud Sadri (27), killed by a bullet on June 15, 2009, in Tehran; his body was given to his family after $6,000 was paid, plus a $350 charge for the bullet.
63. Seyyed Reza Tabatabaei (30), killed by a bullet to his head on June 20, 2009, in Tehran.
64. Vahid Reza Tabatabaei (29), killed by a bullet to his head on June 26, 2009, in Tehran.
65. Hossein Toufanpour, killed by a bullet to his head on June 20, 2009, in Tehran.
66. Hossein Tahmasebi (25), killed when his head was repeatedly hit by an object on June 15, 2009, in Kermanshah.
67. Salar Tahmasebi (27), university student, killed by a bullet to his head on June 20, 2009, in Tehran.
68. Maysam Ebadi, killed by a bullet to his abdomen on June 13, 2009, in Tehran's Sadeghieh Square.
69. Saeed Abbasi (28), killed on June 20, 2009; his body was given to his family after $8,000 was paid.
70. Abolfazl Abdollahi (21), killed by a bullet to his head on June 20, 2009, in Tehran.
71. Hamid Araghi, killed by a bullet on June 27, 2009; his family, initially told to pay $12,000 for his body, eventually paid $5,000.
72. Kaveh Alipour (19), killed on June 20, 2009; his family paid $3,000 to get his body.
73. Mostafa Ghanyan, university student, killed in the attack on the Tehran University dormitory on June 15, 2009.
74. Reza Fattahi, university student, killed in the Kahrizak detention center on July 14, 2009.
75. Ali Fathalian, killed in Tehran; nothing else is known.
76. Shahram Faraji (30), killed on December 28, 2009 (Day of Ashura) in Tehran.
77. Mehdi Farhadirad (34), killed by a bullet to his face on December 28, 2009 (Day of Ashura) in Tehran.
78. Mohammad Hossein Fayzi (28); nothing is known about how he was killed.
79. Sajjad Ghaed Rahmati; nothing is known about how he was murdered.
80. Salar Ghorbani Param (22); nothing is known about how he was murdered.
81. Rahim Mahmoudpour, killed by a bullet on August 3, 2009, in Tehran.
82. Hamid Maddah Shourcheh, university student, killed after his head was repeatedly hit by an object.
83. Moazzez (27), killed by a bullet to his eye on June 20, 2009, near Tehran's Azadi Square.
84. Pouya Azadbeigi, arrested on June 20, 2009, and died soon after his release.
85. Dr. Moghsoudlou; nothing is known about the circumstances of his murder.
86. Behzad Mohajer (47), killed by a bullet to his heart on June 15, 2009.
87. Maryam Mehraaein (24); nothing is known about how she was murdered.
88. Taraneh Mousavi, murdered on June 28, 2009.
89. Seyyed Ali Mousavi Habibi (42), nephew of Mir Hossein Mousavi, assassinated on December 28, 2009 (Day of Ashura) in Tehran.
90. Mostafa Mirebrahimi (22), killed under torture in August 2009.
91. Mohammad Naderipour, university student and Mousavi campaign worker.
92. Nader Naseri, killed on June 20, 2009, in Tehran.
93. Ahmad Nejati, killed by hits to his head.
94. Ahmad Naeimabadi, killed by a bullet in Tehran's Azadi Square.
95. Iman Namazi, university student, killed in the attack on the Tehran University dormitory on June 15, 2009.
96. Mohammad Ali Nikzadi (22), architect, killed by a bullet to his abdomen on June 16, 2009, in Tehran.
97. Masoud Hashemzadeh, killed by a bullet on June 20, 2009, in Tehran.
98. Iman Hashemi (27), killed by a bullet to his eye on June 20, 2009, in Azadi Street in Tehran.
99. Mostafa Kashani Rasa, Mousavi campaign worker, killed by a bullet at the campaign headquarters in Gheytarieh, Tehran, on June 14, 2009.
100. Mohammad Kamrani (18), died in Tehran's Mehr Hospital.
101. Mehdi Karami (25), killed by a bullet to his neck on June 15, 2009, in Tehran.
102. Mostafa Karim Beigi (27), murdered by a bullet to his head on October 27, 2009.
103. Parisa Kolli (25), university graduate, killed by a bullet to her neck on June 21, 2009, in Tehran.
104. Majid Kamali (23), killed on August 25, 2009.
105. Amir Kaviri; nothing is known about how he was murdered.
106. Mostafa Kiarostami (22), killed by hits to his head on July 17, 2009.
107. Milad Yazdanpanah (30), killed by a bullet in Azadi Street in Tehran.

Three other people lost their lives for the Green Movement. One is Mohammad Asghari, who was a computer expert and worked for the office of computer security at the Ministry of Interior. He leaked a considerable amount of information about the actual vote count after the rigged June 2009 election and mysteriously lost his life in a car accident soon thereafter. It is widely believed that he was murdered.

The other two are Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani (37) and Arash Rahmanipour (19). They had been arrested before the election, but were hanged in early January 2010 in what is widely believed to be a message to the supporters of the Green Movement that they too could be hanged. Neither one had committed any serious offense.
In addition, Dr. Masoud Ali-Mohammadi, professor of physics at the University of Tehran, was assassinated. There is considerable evidence that he was murdered by the hardliners, although this is not a certainty.

These are freedom fighters who lost their precious lives for their ideals. Their place in history is assured. The Iranian people will never forget them.

Mir Hossein Mousavi has declared 1389 the year of patience, resistance against the hardliners, and efforts to achieve citizens' legal rights. Certainly, those who have lost loved ones need a lot of patience. Let us hope that by the end of the year Iran will be well on its way to a democratic society, so that those who lost their loved ones can see the fruits of their sacrifice.

Muhammad Sahimi is a columnist for Tehran Bureau.

Copyright © 2010 Tehran Bureau

Pride Toronto in hiding after spirited denunciation from queer leaders

No one takes giant shame placard from former honorees

Marcus McCann

Armed with an oversized cardboard shame award, a group of queers trying to give back their trophies ran into a problem on June 7: the offices of Pride Toronto (PT) were locked.

As one, two and eventually three police cruisers showed up, it became increasingly clear than no one from PT was going to accept the giant shame certificate nor the statuettes from former grand marshals, honoured dykes and other honorees.

A police officer on hand said that no one was inside the building but that someone from PT had alerted police to the protest on Sunday, apparently out of fear it would lead to vandalism.

After PT announced that its board had voted 4-3 to ban the term “Israeli Apartheid” from the parade, queer community leaders mobilized to pressure PT’s board to reverse its decision. First, Alan Li refused to accept the title of grand marshal, then Jane Farrow declined the honoured dyke title. Since then, both Michelle Walker (community service award) and ILGA (international marshals) have turned down honours.

During the press conference, PT issued a statement on its website, saying the decision to ban the term "Israeli Apartheid" was not taken lightly.

"The board of Pride Toronto listened to members of our community," it said. "What we heard overwhelmingly was that the use of the words 'Israeli Apartheid' made participants feel unsafe."

Tim McCaskell, a member of Queers Against Israeli Apartheid (QuAIA), spoke to Xtra after PT's release.

"If people feel unsafe, I would suggest that they are being manipulated," he said. "If the word is 'uncomfortable,' well, Pride makes a lot of people uncomfortable."

An hour earlier, you could have heard a pin drop when James Loney approached the podium at the 519 Community Centre, where more than 100 queers gathered for a press conference before marching on the PT office.

Loney — a peace activist who spent four months as a hostage in Iraq — was one of nearly two dozen PT honorees    giving back their awards.

“Us queers know it in our bones: silence equals death,” Loney said, as he discussed how silence affected him and his partner following his abduction.

Video of the press conference:

Loney was joined by Farrow, Walker and a raft of others who spoke against PT. On hand were:

Queer leaders carried a "Shame Award" to the doorstep of Pride Toronto's Dundonald St office.

James Loney (“Fearless” Theme Award, 2006)
Zahra Dhanani (Honoured Dyke, 2006)
Sky Gilbert (Grand Marshal, 2000)
Faith Nolan (Honoured Dyke, 2009)
El-Farouk Khaki (Grand Marshal, 2009)
Rachel Epstein (Honoured Dyke, 2007)
Gareth Henry (International Grand Marshal, 2008)
Anna Willats (Honoured Dyke, 2008)
JP Hornick (Grand Marshal, 2002)
John Greyson (Arts & Culture Award, 2009)
Savoy Howe (Award for Excellence in Sports, 2008)
Leonardo Zuniga (Human Rights Award, 2009)
Matthew Cutler (Youth Award, 2009)
Michelle Walker (Community Service Award, 2010)
Jane Farrow (Honoured Dyke, 2010)

Six others were to return their awards but couldn’t attend in person:

Gloria Careaga and Renato Sabbadini (International Grand Marshals, 2010)

Faisal Alam (Spirituality Award, 2009)

Victor Mukasa (International Grand Marshal, 2009)

Salah Bachir (Grand Marshal, 2005)

Rosanna Flamer-Caldera (International Grand Marshal, 2007)

Alan Li (Grand Marshal, 2010)

Discontent with PT went beyond its banning of “Israeli Apartheid,” as speaker after speaker drew links between the act of censorship and other moves to whitewash the celebrations.

Farrow pointed out that performers on all PT stages must sign an agreement promising not to say anything offensive or political. Farrow says the clause, which has been in effect since 2008, was defended by PT organizers as preventing musicians from endorsing, for instance, mayoral candidates.

“This is not speech that anyone needs to be protected from,” she said.

JP Hornick, one of the women charged in the Pussy Palace raids, decried the de-sexing and de-politicizing of Pride.

“This is not a parade; it’s a march. It’s about sex. It’s about who we fuck,” she said.

Anna Willats, Pride Toronto's honoured dyke in 2008, told the boisterous room that queers need to take back Pride “if we want to put on a World Pride [in 2014] that doesn’t look like the Santa Claus Parade.”

Performer, playwright and provocateur Sky Gilbert remembered his experience of being told not to perform sex acts on his float in the late ’90s, after he gave head to a dyke’s strap-on dildo the year before.

He also defended PT executive director Tracey Sandilands — sort of.

“I’m sure that she’s a nice person. I suspect that she’s maybe a nice person. Tracey Sandilands is the new face of corporate Pride, but she’s just doing her job,” he said, adding that political queers have allowed Pride to become a sanitized spectacle.

Musician Faith Nolan says that she’s been following as alternative Pride events spring up. She was invited to perform at one — apparently to be held at the Gladstone — which was to be a non-political show of unity that didn’t choose sides between PT and QuAIA.

“I looked at it and I emailed them back and said, 'Absolutely not,’” adding, “If you don’t stand for something, you’ll fall for anything.”

Groups will outline plans for alternative Pride celebrations at a community meeting at The 519 tonight (Monday, June 7), at 6:30pm. The proceedings will be streamed at xtra.ca. (UPDATE: Watch our recording below. First chunk missing due to internet connection issues at the event — our apologies!)

Kanellos the Greek Protest Dog

Kanellos, the dog that has been seen at nearly every demonstration in Athens over the last two years has turned up again during the recent protests against new austerity measures

Kanellos stood guard over a line of protesters in December when students took to the streets to protest against a plan for policing at universities

Kanellos, the hound always seems to side with the protesters, whatever the dispute

Kanellos has been a regular of scenes of social unrest for two years and is unfazed even by water cannon

At another protest in December, Kanellos appeared again

It scavenges from a bottle of milk dropped by farmers during a protest near Syntagma Square in central Athens

During a rally against an agreement between Piraeus port management and a Chinese company

Kanellos joins a single demonstrator in a sit-down protest

Teargas explodes right in front of the curious canine

However ugly the confrontation, the dog is unperturbed

Ahmadinejad’s Security Cabinet

Photo: Sadegh Mahsouli (standing) says he is worth $160 million.
He was a penniless IRGC officer at the end of the Iran-Iraq war.

By MUHAMMAD SAHIMI in Los Angeles

[TEHRAN BUREAU] Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has announced the list of people who will fill key cabinet positions, including those who will deal with security issues.

The author had already identified four candidates likely to be the next Minister of Intelligence (MI). One of the two top candidates, Heidar Moslehi, was announced as Ahmadinejad’s choice to head Intelligence. Moslehi is a mid-rank cleric who is currently the head of the Organization for Islamic Endowments (vaghf) and Charities, which runs a vast network of mosques, endowed Islamic charities, and other endowed organizations. When Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005, he appointed Moslehi as his adviser for clerical affairs. At that time Moslehi was the representative of Ayatollah Khamenei in the Basij militia. But, his appointment was protested by many because he was involved with the Basij and, thus, he resigned after three months. Ayatollah Khamenei then appointed Moslehi to his present post.

If approved by the Majles (parliament), Moslehi will probably enhance dramatically the influence of the military in the security and intelligence apparatus because of his ties to the Basij. As previously reported by the author, the increasing influence of the military, particularly the intelligence unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), has been a prime reason for the resignation of many senior figures in the MI.

When former Intelligence Minister Gholamgoseein Mohseni Ejehei and two of his deputies submitted a report to Ayatollah Khamenei, in which they rejected the claim by the IRGC and Ahmadinejad that linked the demonstrations after the rigged presidential election of June 12 to a plan for a “velvet revolution,” Ahmadinejad reportedly said during a gathering of the senior staff of the MI, that, “I am not happy with the Ministry of Intelligence.” He now has his own man at the Ministry.

The current Minister of Defense (MD), Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar, will take over the Interior Ministry. There was already a clue that Najjar would leave his position at Defense and be moved to a new cabinet position: in the Majlis ceremony two weeks ago when Ahmadinejad took the oath of the office, Mohammad-Najjar, a Brigadier General, had appeared in civilian clothes.

Mohammad-Najjar was born in Tehran in 1956. He was active in the 1979 Revolution and joined the IRGC at its inception, three months after the Revolution’s victory in February 1979. There was some unrest in the Kurdistan province at that time, and Mohammad-Najjar actively participated in quelling that unrest (which had resulted in extensive bloodshed). He was then an IRGC staff officer responsible for the Sistan and Baluchestan province in southeastern Iran on the border with Pakistan. After Iran’s armed forces successfully pushed Iraqi forces from most of Iran in the spring of 1982, Ayatollah Khomeini approved the establishment of a Middle East Directorate, and Mohammad-Najjar, who speaks Arabic fluently, was appointed as its first director. The IRGC dispatched an expeditionary force to Lebanon in the summer of 1982 (after Israel had invaded Lebanon), which was stationed in the Biqa Valley in the eastern part of the country, where it trained the future fighters of the Lebanese Hezbollah, which was officially founded in February 1985.

Mohammad-Najjar returned to Iran in 1985. At that time, the IRGC was under the control of the Ministry of the Guards, and Mohammad-Najjar held various positions in the armament industry that the IRGC was setting up. In 1989, the Ministries of Defense and Guards merged under former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Mohaamad- Najjar was appointed the head of the armament section of the Organization of Defense (Military) Industries (ODI), a position that he held until 2005, when he was appointed the Minister of Defense. During his tenure, the ODI was turned into a relatively efficient organization that has played a key role in Iran’s rapid advancement in the area of developing new missiles, and turning self-sufficient in producing a large part of its conventional ammunition. He has also played a key role in the expansion of military ties between Iran and Russia, having traveled there several times.

Mohammad-Najjar has a B.Sc. degree in mechanical engineering from the Khajeh Nasireddin Toosi in Tehran, and an M.S. in executive management from the Organization of Industrial Management. He is considered a hardliner among the top commanders of the IRGC.

Mohammad-Najjar’s post at the MD will be taken up by Sadegh Mahsouli, the current Minister of Interior. He is known in Iran as the “billionaire minister.” When he was proposed by Ahmadinejad to be his first Minister of Oil in 2005, Mahsouli admitted in response to questions asked during his confirmation proceedings in Majlis that his net worth was about $160 million (or 1.6 billion touman in Iranian currency, hence the nickname), although many believe that his net worth is probably much higher. The Majles rejected his nomination as the Minister of Oil, partly because Mahsouli could not provide a satisfactory answer to the question of how he, a dirt poor IRGC officer in 1988 at the end of Iran-Iraq war, could amass such a large wealth during such a short time.

Ahmadinejad then appointed Mahsouli as his adviser. In November 2008, after Ali Kordan, Ahmadinejad’s second Minister of Interior was impeached by the Majles when it was revealed that not only did he not have a doctoral degree from Oxford University (as he had claimed), but that his most advanced degree was a simple Associates Degree, Ahmadinejad appointed Mahsouli as his Minister of Interior. (Ahmadinejad’s first Interior Minister, Mostafa Pourmohammadi, was fired). Mahsouli’s appointment was narrowly approved by the Majles. As the supervisor of the election, Mahsouli played a key role in events leading up to June 12.

Mahsouli was born in 1959 in Orumieyeh, located in Western Azerbaijan province. He received a B.Sc. degree in civil engineering from Iran University of Science and Technology in Tehran, where he was a classmate and friend of Ahmadinejad. He joined the IRGC, fought in the Iran-Iraq war, and held high military positions, such as the commander of the 6^th Special Forces division, head of the inspection of the IRGC, and deputy MD in charge of planning. He was also the governor of Orumiyeh, and deputy governor-general for the Western Azerbaijan province.

It was during his work in Western Azerbaijan that Mahsouli amassed his initial millions. At that time Ahmadinejad was the governor-general of Ardabil province, which is on Iran’s border with the Republic of Azerbaijan. The two nations were swapping oil: Iran would buy oil from Azerbaijan for local use, and deliver equivalent amounts to its southern seaports for export. Ahmadinejad helped put Mahsouli in charge of oil swaps, which made him close to $10 million and got him started in his business ventures. Later, Mahsouli used his connections to illicitly take control of 17,000 square meters of land in one of Tehran’s best neighborhood, worth millions of dollars.

Saeed Jalili, Iran’s current chief nuclear negotiator and secretary-general of the Supreme National Security Council, will be appointed the new Foreign Minister (FM). The current FM, Manouchehr Mottaki, a career diplomat, will apparently leave the government.

Jalili was born in 1965 in Mashhad, in northeastern Iran. He has a Ph.D. in political science from Imam Sadegh (Sadeq) University in Tehran. The University was established in 1982 by the powerful conservative clergy, Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, the head of the Society of the Militant Clergy. The conservatives’ goal in establishing this university (and others, such as the Islamic Azad University, and the Payaam-e Nour University) has been educating and training conservative students to fill Iran’s bureaucracy. Jalili’s research was on political thinking according to the holy Quran.

From 2001-2005, Jalili was the director-general of the office of the Supreme Leader, where he worked closely with hardliners in that office. An old friend of Ahmadinejad, Jalili was his first choice for the post of FM in 2005, but after he was opposed by various factions within the conservative camp, Jalili was appointed the deputy FM for European and American affairs. In October 2007, after Ali Larijani, the current Speaker of the Majles, suddenly resigned from his posts as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator and secretary-general of the Supreme National Security Council, Jalili was appointed to both posts. But his inexperience in the nuclear area was so glaring that after his appointment, Larijani accompanied him to Rome for a negotiation session with the European Union.

Jalili has a reputation for being extremely arrogant. He is known to have given long lectures to his European counterparts in nuclear negotiations, repeating himself and his claims without paying much attention to what his counterparts say. He is, of course, a hardliner.

Jalili has played a key role in the June 12 election coup. Together with a few others, such as Hossein Taeb, the Basij militia commander, he was a major player in the “control room” leading the election coup, apparently led by Mojtaba Khamenei, and Major General Mohammad Ali (Aziz) Jafari, the IRGC’s top commander. His key role in that affair is now apparently being rewarded by Ahmadinejad.

Who's behind Tehran's violence?

There is no English equivalent for the Farsi words Efraat and Tafrit. They refer to the possibility of extremism on both sides of an issue, and they were much in use during the third day of peaceful marches in Tehran on Wednesday.

Despite official warnings against gathering, at least half a million people marched along a street in central Tehran Wednesday afternoon to protest the reelection of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a vote that many believe was blatantly rigged. After three days of ignoring the demonstrators, who believe opposition candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi was the true victor, state-run Iranian television showed some images of Wednesday's activities. But its reporters chose to talk only to the ordinary citizens on the sidelines, who complained about the Mousavi supporters as a nuisance who were creating traffic in the city and bringing businesses to a halt. The crowd was peaceful and quiet, as they have been in previous days. But a chant against the director of Iranian television, Ezatollah Zarghami, was one of the few slogans heard today. "Shame, Shame, Zarghami!" people intoned.

What incensed people about the television coverage of recent days was its focus on the violence and vandalism that has broken out in sporadic incidents at night, and not the peaceful marches in the afternoons. "It's shameful that the state-run media show all of us as a group of hooligans who break shop windows and burn cars," said Mina, a doctor who has taken part in all of the pro-Mousavi demonstrations since Monday. Mina was a political prisoner before and after the revolution. She fought against both the shah and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's regime as a member of an armed communist group. She now believes that violence is passé and counterproductive, and that it is only through peaceful means that Iranians can establish their rights. What worried Mina and other marchers was the violence that has broken out at night, which officials have blamed on Mousavi supporters.

That's possible, but many Mousavi supporters suspect that pro-Ahmadinejad thugs have been staging incidents in order to justify an official backlash. Another worry are scattered antiregime militant groups, who in recent years have committed bombings and assassinations in various parts of the country. On Wednesday morning, Mousavi's wife, Zahra Rahnavard, who was with her husband throughout the presidential campaign, felt the need to remind a group of students that she and her husband still believe in the ideals of the revolution and don't regard anti-Islamic Revolution elements as their allies.

"I think some small terrorist groups and criminal gangs are taking advantage of the situation," says Mina, the doctor. "Thirty years after the revolution and 20 years after the war, the majority of Iranians despise violence and terror. My worry is that if the government doesn't allow reforms to take place, we will fall into a terrorism abyss like the years after the revolution."

The largest one of these groups, the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), killed dozens of Islamic Republic officials as well as thousands of innocent Iranians in the early days of the revolution before relocating to Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-'80s. Since then, the MEK has been regarded by most Iranians as traitors against the country. After the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, they claimed to have put down their guns and offered full cooperation to the Coalition Forces. That initially gained them support from some American and European politicians who saw them as a viable alternative to the ayatollahs in Iran. They enjoy very little popular support inside Iran, yet in their propaganda they have been claiming that the protestors are out in the streets in support of their cause.

Other extremist groups like Jundallah are allies of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, while some are communist in their outlook. The supposed reelection of Ahmadinejad was a gift to such groups. On their Web sites they claim that the alleged rigging of the vote has revealed the true face of the regime. (Like some Israeli commentators, they argue that the victory of a moderate like Mousavi would actually extend the life of the regime.) It is true that in the past, whenever hardliners have intensified their grip, these groups have gained more support. They reacted angrily when pro-reform Mohammad Khatami was elected president in 1997.

On Wednesday afternoon, while the marchers tried to keep their calm and express their anger against what they regard as "stealing their votes" and "an electoral coup d'état," they were also wary of hijacking of their movement by the more violent elements in the opposition. Mousavi has asked his supporters to mourn for the victims of the violence in the past few days. He will then join the people in yet another peaceful march in central Tehran. No one knows what will be the likely outcome of the people's protests. But one thing is clear: violence on both sides will dim any prospect of reform in Iran.

Read Original Article (Via Newsweek International | Newsweek.com)

The War of the Ayatollahs

By HANA H. in Tehran | 25 June 2009

[TEHRAN BUREAU] The fact that there is a war going on between "two senior revolutionary clerics" is not a big secret. The cat was out of the bag when right after one of the election debates one of the two bunched up his robes and headed to Qom to lobby the ayatollahs there.

While no one really knows what happened in Qom, there has been speculation that cleric #2 has tried to unseat cleric #1 and for this, he desperately needs the support of the god squad.

Rumor has it that #2 has approached one of the top sources of emulation in the Shia world to allegedly garner support for his cause, which does not seem all that clear as he has not officially taken a stance on it.

One privilege of being in the same profession is that one usually knows all there is to know about others moving in the same circles and when at war, this information can be used as leverage as this is what appeared to have happened last Friday.

Cleric #1 addressed the nation, issued threats and offered incentives. Mysteriously hinted at the things he knew and would tell all if things did not quiet down. Dangled the good old carrot and brought down the stick. His words however appear to have fallen on deaf ears.

This Friday cleric #2, who has so far kept silent in appearance and not flinched even after his family members were arrested to perhaps get a reaction out of him, was the person who was supposed to take the pulpit.

Every one anticipated his speech as it could have been detrimental, he could have chosen to raise the white flag or declared war and even made counter threats. However it does not seem like he will be given the chance as the one addressing the nation this week will be another cleric who is in cleric #1's team.

The god squad in Qom which had waited out the turmoil to see who was more likely to come out of the ring a winner before deciding which side to support has slowly begun to realize #1 has more pull and now one by one they are coming forth calling for an end to the dispute.

The crisis in Tehran is beyond the defeated candidate and the winner of the race as both are puppets in the game.

The defeated candidate keeps blowing 'hot and cold.' One day he urges people to calm and the next he tells them to protest and says that he is ready for martyrdom; one day he urgently tweets that he wants people to join him in front of Parliament and the next he issues a denial saying he never tweeted this.

He asked people to join him in Tehran's cemetery on Thursday for mourning. Gathering in Tehran cemetery is of great importance, as it is what happened when the founder of the Islamic Republic returned to the country. It was the speech he delivered at the cemetery where the martyrs of the revolution had been laid to rest that changed the future of Iran.

The puppeteers of this show knew that such a gathering taking place would mean giving legitimacy to the cause of the defeated candidates. What could have turned into a bloody confrontation was called off by organizers.

The winner of the race appears to be assured of where he stands as there have been no statements coming from his direction. The streets of Tehran look more like the streets of Baghdad with checkpoints set up throughout the capital and IRGC uniformed men patrolling the streets and stopping people at whim.

Fewer and fewer people seem to be coming out and protests seem to have lost their momentum. After dark, the sound of Allah o Akbar still resonates through the night followed by gunshots to frighten people.

They even say that certain people go around and spray paint the doors of homes where the sound of Allah o Akbar comes from so that they can arrest people the next day. Maybe even to scare them into thinking that someone is on to them and they could be arrested at any moment.

People seem to have lost their hope and to have realized that the change they were looking for will never come. They seem to have accepted that they have no power to assert their rights and justice is deaf, dumb and blind.

The winner of the Ayatollah wars has proven his point and taught everyone a lesson.

Copyright © 2009 Tehran Bureau

A View from the Frontline

[TEHRAN BUREAU] Last week, a group of friends and I organized a medical team to help the wounded and injured in the streets. As we sewed up gashes and patched up wounds on the beautiful battered faces of our dear Iranians, we kept asking ourselves, “What have they become? Have they no regard for the life for a fellow human being? For the life of a fellow countryman? For the life of a neighbor? For the life of a cousin? For the life of a brother? For the life of a sister?”

It wasn’t long before Basij militiamen took away our identity cards. After reporting us to the university, I was called in by a disciplinary committee and reprimanded. I was told I had put my future career and even my life in jeopardy. I was told to think about the consequences of my actions.

As I left the committee members, the events of the past two weeks fell into place:

The government had a plan. They thought their plan was perfect. They had devised a perfect fraud in which regardless of how people voted, only one name would emerge as the winner: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

It was to be the start of an era of unopposed rule.

By creating the appearance of a free and open atmosphere, by creating hope of change, people would turnout in high numbers. A high turnout at the ballot boxes would give them an aura of legitimacy in the eyes of the world. It would give Ahmadinejad a mandate.

But they made a fatal miscalculation; they underestimated the people.

When the results were announced, nobody in their right mind believed them. Even the most optimistic of Ahmadinejad supporters didn’t believe he could win by such a margin.

This prompted widespread unrest. For the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic the ruling establishment had to contend with masses in the streets. These masses had not been dragged there by intimidation or by promise of a reward. For the first time the masses were not chanting pro-government slogans.

This was something entirely new; it was a nation rising up in defiance of all the tricks the government has been pulling over the years.

Despite their miscalculation, the supreme leader and the revolutionary guard elites were not ready to make any concessions; they knew too well. Even a single step back would have been a starting point from where things would cascade down to the eventual breakdown of their perfect autocracy.

So they took a firm stand against the very people who had brought them to power 30 years ago. History will be the judge but I believe that this was their second and most fatal miscalculation. You can never put out a fire by beating it, the flames may wane but underneath the ashes will go on burning. Wheels have been set in motion. A vast movement has started to take place. In time, the tide will turn.

In February 1979, during the time of the revolution, the army chiefs decided to prevent bloodshed and a civil war, so they refused to crack down on the demonstrators. They were thanked for this by swift executions that took place as soon as the revolutionaries came to power.

Sepah, or the Revolutionary Guard, is apparently determined not to go down the same path.

The decision of the current government to brutally crack down on the protesters and demonstrators led to the massacre of June 20, 2009, a day that will go down in history as the Black Saturday of the Islamic Republic. Thirty years ago, 17 Shahrivar 1357 [September 8, 1978], the Pahlavi Regime made the same fatal mistake. That Black Friday was the turning point from which the Pahlavi Regime never recovered.

We had hoped for a swift and decisive victory, first in the election and then through our defiance, but our high hopes were crushed with bullets, batons and tear gas. Now the mood is that of defeat, anguish and despair.

Fear has crept in and taken hold. Everybody now speaks in whispers. We are depressed and hopeless. Perhaps the main reason everyone feels so down is that before the election we had such high hopes. We flew too high and then fell down or rather were brought down by Basij and anti-riot police.

This struggle has had its toll on us all. I have never seen so many people grieving. This is a social malaise. At the personal level, each of us still feels robbed of our vote, our freedom, our friends, our brothers and our sisters.

We are disillusioned, battered and betrayed. Many are talking about leaving the country. Many young souls are looking for the first exit. Emigration perhaps. A mass exodus may be under way.

In the past few days, I have been feeling down and depressed. I had a sense that all was lost, and the frequent rains, which are extremely unusual for this time of year, added to the sense of melancholy overcoming me. My uncle, who experienced the revolution, told me however, “Evolution takes time. This was just a start; in time things will change.”

I hope so.

Politics and power are dirty things, much more so than depicted by Romain Gary in “L’Homme a la colombe.” Even so, the protagonist, also a young soul, emerges victorious. We are sacrificing ourselves to make a statement, which the corrupt politicians ignore and the mass media manipulates. But people, generation after generation, pass this on from heart to heart as a slogan for integrity, bravery and freedom.

Maybe this will be our legacy. Maybe years from now, we will recount the stories of these days to the generation after us as the turning point that made all the difference, if not in our lives, perhaps at least in theirs.

Copyright © 2009 Tehran Bureau